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Authority and accountability - Management of the APS

Ms Helen Williams AO
Public Service Commissioner
IPAA ACT Division Annual General Meeting - 1998

In his invaluable 1990 paper on the role of Secretaries of Departments , Mike Codd considers the relationships, duties and accountabilities of Secretaries and the impact on these of the considerable increase in the scale and complexity of operations over the previous twenty years.

The direction of the change that we are now seeing in the operation of the Australian Public Service (APS) had its genesis before Mike's paper was published. But the degree of that change, eight years later, warrants another look at the framework of authority and accountability in the management of the APS, particularly at the point of interface between the Public Service and government.

Underlying pressures for change confront public sectors globally. Governments are demanding better use of community resources as well as greater relevance and effectiveness in a globally competitive environment. Public sector leaders must respond to both these demands. They must increase performance and adapt to new frameworks at the same time as maintaining the values and accountability of public service.

To enable them to respond to these demands, Agency Heads in the APS have been given much greater authority to manage, through the removal of prescription and regulation and the delegation to them of management powers for their agency.

In brief, agency heads are now able to:-

• within the context of the relevant legislation, settle their employees' terms and conditions of employment (Workplace Relations Act 1996);
• make use of greater flexibility and autonomy in their financial management (Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997); and
• set their own processes for recruitment and appointment of staff, for mobility and for the management of poor performance (Regulations and Commissioner's delegations - in the case of the Regulations, subject to the outcome of the current notice of disallowance).

We are all familiar with the traditional public service advice to new graduates that "public servants advise and Ministers decide". How do the new freedoms and demands for higher performance fit the traditional framework, and have the authority and accountability relationships altered?

The basic framework

Although the Australian Constitution provides for the structure of Executive Government, it offers little insight into how the Executive Government of the Commonwealth should operate.

Under the Constitution, the executive power of the Commonwealth, vested in the Queen, is exercisable by the Governor-General (Section 61). But the Governor-General exercises his or her powers in accordance with the principle of responsible government, thus acting in accordance with advice from the Ministers of the Government (Section 62). Ministers administer Departments of State (Section 64), and the appointment and removal of "all other officers of the Executive Government" (civil servants) is vested in the Governor-General in Council unless delegated to some other authority (Section 67).

Further definition is contained in the Public Service Act 1922 which provides in subsection 25(2) that:

"The Secretary of a Department shall, under the Minister, be responsible for its general working, and for all the business thereof, and shall advise the Minister in all matters relating to the Department."

As Mike Codd points out, this subsection was amended in 1984 "to clarify the traditional understanding of the relationship between Ministers and secretaries to departments in relation to their responsibilities for the administration of departments". The then Government stated at the time that "... except where specific powers are vested in a secretary by statute, legislation will now make it clear that a secretary's responsibility for the general working of a department is subject to the Minister's powers under the Constitution". (Codd p.6)

The view of the Attorney-General's Department in 1984 was that the effect of the amendment would be that:

• there would be very little, if anything, that happened in a department that would lie beyond the Minister's responsibility;
• the Secretary, in exercising any of his or her powers and functions, would be required to take into account the wishes of the Minister; but
• where specific powers are conferred by the Act on the Secretary (such as the power to transfer or promote an officer), the Minister would not be able to direct the Secretary as to their exercise in a particular way.

The 1984 changes, and in particular the move towards rotating senior management positions after five years, were accompanied by some debate on the terminology to be used to describe Heads of Departments - the generic term at that time being "Permanent Head". The 1983 White Paper Reforming the Australian Public Service favoured the use of "Departmental Head" as the generic term, using "Secretary" for individual positions, as more in line with the primary responsibility of the Minister for administering the Department.

Paul Keating linked the two concepts when commenting later on the 1984 reforms:

"We added three simple words to the description of the responsibilities of heads of departments: "under the Minister". Three simple words which said it all. And we stopped using the description "Permanent Head".

Recent legislation shows a degree of divergence in this area. Although the Public Service Bill and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 use the term "Secretary", the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Auditor-General Act 1997 use "Chief Executive".

But whatever term is used, the relationship between Minister and Agency Head is obviously a sensitive one. As an observer of the Secretary's role in the Canadian system remarked "The ambiguities associated with the (Secretary's) job mean that it is not an occupation for someone who wants a clear mandate".

One of the aims of the Government's Public Service Bill is to assist in clarifying the role and responsibilities of Secretaries by placing Departmental Secretaries and Agency Heads at the centre of the accountability framework. The Bill strengthens and enhances the role of Secretaries as employers. It also increases their accountability for the considerable powers they will exercise.

(I should mention here that I have included the Bill in this discussion even though it is not currently on the Parliamentary Notice Paper because it represents the balance of changes that the Government is seeking to achieve.)

Employer Powers

Within this basic framework, one of the key factors in determining authority is the location of the employer power.

Prior to its abolition in 1987, the Public Service Board effectively exercised, on behalf of the Commonwealth, all the rights, duties and powers of APS employers under the Public Service Act 1922. Key specifics in this respect involved:

• determining conditions and standards for appointment, promotion and transfer;
• approving the appointment or employment of officers and employees;
• prescribing or determining APS classifications, pay rates, and terms and conditions of employment; and
• representing the APS and, when requested, some or all Ministers and Departments in proceedings before external industrial tribunals with jurisdiction in APS matters.

As the successor to the Board in 1987, the newly-established Public Service Commissioner directly acquired all of the Board's Public Service Act powers. However, key APS employer provisions (in particular, in relation to the determination of pay rates and terms and conditions of employment) were delegated to the Secretary, Department of Industrial Relations (DIR). In addition, powers to appoint and employ staff, other than in relation to the SES over which the Board had obtained increased powers in the 1984 changes, were delegated progressively and extensively to Departmental Secretaries. Thus, while the Commissioner, in law, retains the employer powers under the Public Service Act 1922 , the powers are now generally exercised by other authorities except where they concern the SES.

In the context of action taken in the 1987-1989 period to develop legislation for redistribution of the Board's functions, the then Public Service Commissioner and DIR Secretary were involved in extended negotiations on where the APS employer powers should properly reside. Ultimately, former Industrial Relations Ministers Willis and Morris agreed that the Minister should exercise the employer role (with particular reference to powers in relation to APS remuneration and terms and conditions of employment), but that the Commissioner should retain the personnel management aspects of the role.

To a significant extent, and particularly in relation to the APS employer role concerning remuneration and terms and conditions of employment, the need for action has been overtaken by the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act).

Workplace Relations Act

In broad terms, the WR Act provides for 'the Commonwealth' to be the employer for the purposes of that Act; the relevant Minister together with the Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business to be the 'employing authority' for the purposes of agency Certified Agreements; and the relevant Secretary, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth, to be the employer for the purposes of the Australian Workplace Agreements.

The Government intends the APS to operate under the same industrial relations and employment arrangements as apply to the rest of the workforce, to the maximum extent consistent with its public responsibilities. The public responsibilities test is met largely through the Government's Policy Parameters for Agreement Making in the APS which apply to both AWAs and Certified Agreements. Of specific interest is the requirement for agreements to "be subject to having significant policy issues cleared by the agency with its relevant Minister."

The relevant Minister's role in being the 'employing authority' for agency Certified Agreements and clearing significant issues for AWAs may, at first sight, appear to be inconsistent with the specific provision in the Public Service Bill for the prohibition of ministerial interference in relation to the employment of individuals (Section 19).

The Bill's provision, however, is concerned with preventing intervention by the Minister in specific staff selections. The Minister's 'employing authority' role would not be concerned with such detail; the focus of agreement making in the APS is on tailoring conditions of employment to the needs of the agency, or the workplace, and to its employees as a group.

Indeed the same distinction could be said to exist, although less formally, in the current Public Service Act. The Attorney-General's Department's view of the 1984 changes to the Act, mentioned above, confirms the general primacy of the Minister but:

"where specific powers are conferred by the Act on the Secretary (such as the power to transfer or promote an officer), the Minister would not be able to direct the Secretary as to their exercise in a particular way".

And the issue of balance between the role of the government of the day in the determination of pay and conditions policy and the need for independence in specific public service staffing conditions was already under debate, when the Public Service Board still had a strong control role in personnel matters.

Bruce McCallum draws attention to Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's 1973 address supporting the Board's independent role in staffing matters:

"Ever since the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854, it has been thought proper in Westminster type systems of government, for the staffing of the Civil Service to be independent of the government of the day";

At the same time, however, the Board itself was well aware of the statutory limitations to its independence in relation to the broader issue of determination of pay and conditions of employment, emphasising in 1974 that:

"regulations made by the Board are subject to the normal Executive Council processes and to disallowance by the Parliament".

In keeping with the trend towards increasing devolution to Agency Heads, however, I understand that the intention, as part of the reforms associated with the new Public Service Bill, is to amend the Regulations to prescribe the Secretary of the particular Department (rather than its Minister) and the Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business as the employing authority for APS employees.

Public Service Bill

In line with the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996, the Public Service Bill 1997 provides for an Agency Head to have, on behalf of the Commonwealth, all the rights, duties and powers of an employer in respect of APS employees in the Agency. While the Crown remains the employer and, under section 21, the Prime Minister will be able to issue general directions on management and leadership of the APS, the Bill formalises the role of Secretaries as the employer's direct representative.

Several other Acts retain an approval role for the Public Service Commissioner in relation to the terms and conditions of non-APS staff. This residual PSB power, now delegated to the Secretary of the Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business (DWRSB), will be removed by amendment to the relevant Acts via the Public Employment (Consequential and Transitional) Amendment Bill 1997 (CTA Bill). In addition, the Commonwealth's employer powers in the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 and the Maternity Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1973, currently vested in the Secretary of the DWRSB will, under the CTA Bill, be vested directly in Secretaries and other Agency Heads.

One of the main causes of the complexity of the public service employment framework has been the convoluted interrelationships between the Public Service Act and its subordinate legislation on the one hand and industrial awards and agreements on the other. In some cases, awards or agreements have overridden legislative provisions on the same topic.

The PS Bill aimed to reduce this complexity by establishing a clearer distinction between:

• those aspects of public service employment, such as the Code of Conduct or the merit principle, which involve such an element of public interest that they need to be set out either in primary or disallowable legislation; and
• those aspects of public service employment which should be treated the same as any other employer-employee relationship, such as pay and conditions of employment or processes of termination of employment, which are more appropriately regulated by the same legislation that applies to the rest of the workforce.

Primarily because of the public interest aspect of APS employment, the employment powers of APS Agency Heads will probably never equate fully those of the Private Sector. But recent changes have moved a significant distance in that direction and will see the employment power and flexibility of Agency Heads to manage their own workplace considerably enhanced.

Public Service Commissioner

The progressive devolution of employment and staffing powers from the centre has obviously had a significant impact on the role of the Public Service Commissioner.

The origin of the office, in the Public Service Act 1902, must be seen in the context of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms to the British Civil Service 50 years earlier and the emphasis on the adoption of the merit principle.

It is clear that, at that stage, the system as a whole was not to be trusted. Bruce McCallum quotes a speech by the then Attorney-General Alfred Deakin:

"Above the permanent heads there will be the Commissioner and his inspectors. They are the watchdogs of the public, of Parliament and of the Minister....to prevent the administration of the department from falling into the hands of its permanent heads, and the exercise of favouritism by them." (McCallum p.105)

In line with the view of the first Public Service Commissioner, Duncan McLachlan, in his report on the administration of the Public Service, that:

"Successful management of the Public Service is dependent upon....control by one authority in whom is vested wide and independent powers of adjudication and administration" ,

the 1992 Act maintained this focus on control and supervision from the centre, vesting most of the authority for managing the APS in a new, powerful central personnel authority, the Public Service Board.

The vision for the Public Service Commissioner under the draft Public Service Bill is very different.

The principle of independence remains firmly established. The provision in the 1922 Act that the Commissioner may be removed from office only if both Houses of Parliament present an address to the Governor-General "praying for the removal of the Commissioner on the grounds of misbehaviour or physical or mental incapacity" (Section 47) has been retained virtually unaltered.

Indeed, to a certain extent the Government sees the independence of the position as increased under the Bill. In the second reading speech in the House of Representatives, Mr Reith noted that:

"The Bill will set out the public interest. It will also provide new mechanisms for its protection. To this end, the powers and independence of the Public Service Commissioner are to be considerably enhanced."

(The independence of the role is, of course, closely related to its statutory functions. In the role of Head of a Statutory Agency, the Commissioner is subject to and accountable to the Agency Minister, and through him or her to Parliament, in the same way as any Agency Head.)

Similarly, the Bill (Section 10) retains a strong emphasis on the merit principle in employment, including it in the APS values and defining it in some detail to protect the integrity of the hiring or promotion process.

Within the devolved environment of the Public Service Bill, the Public Service Commissioner is given a range of functions to give effect to two key roles. First, the Commissioner will uphold the ethos of the public service and maintain appropriate standards for public servants. Second, the Commissioner will promote and facilitate - rather than seek to regulate - good practice in the management of public servants.

The Bill gives the Commissioner specific statutory functions in relation to evaluating adherence to APS values; procedures for ensuring compliance with the Code of Conduct; inquiring into reports from whistleblowers; and alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct by Agency Heads. It will also have specific statutory functions to develop, promote, review and evaluate employment policies and practices; facilitate continuous improvement in people management; co-ordinate and support training and career development; and contribute to and foster leadership in the APS.

The Bill includes power for the Commissioner to undertake reviews or investigations of APS employment policies or practices, and the Commissioner will be required to report to the Minister, and through him or her to Parliament, each year on the State of the Service, strengthening Parliament's ability to scrutinise service-wide matters.

In his 1993 paper on the Public Service Commissioner, Denis Ives noted that:

"A key issue for the PSC has been how to carry out its role in relation to policy and strategic management in a way which will help achieve the benefits of devolution while avoiding problems which could arise from fragmentation" .

With considerably greater devolution to Agency Heads since Denis's comment, including of the power given to Agency Heads to set remuneration levels, avoidance of fragmentation of the APS could become more of an issue. There are considerable benefits for government in maintaining the advantages of a core APS, particularly in the opportunity it presents for developing and retaining skill, knowledge and experience and for developing the values, ethics and professionalism of an apolitical public service. A challenge for the immediate future will be to retain the benefits of the career service, particularly at the SES level, while encouraging to the full the flexibility and innovation that the broad devolution to agency heads can bring.

Accountability

In the new environment, the important quid pro quo for increased powers is greater accountability for their use.

In using the devolved powers that have been given to them, APS Secretaries must keep in mind the broad context within which they operate and, in particular:

• the primacy of their Minister in administration of their department;
• the position of their Minister as a member of the democratically elected Government;
• the importance of maintaining a clear system of values; and
• the fact that they are dealing with Public money voted by Parliament for specified purposes.

This is not said to make managers risk averse or in any way to provide an excuse for reduced levels of performance. Rather they are factors that need to be taken into account in administering agencies and in managing risk. They also mean that inevitably the focus on both ethics and accountability will be different in the APS than in private sector workplaces.

Ministers

Under the Westminster system, Ministers are members of Cabinet with its emphasis on collective responsibility for decisions taken in that context. Ministers are, however, individually responsible to Parliament for the overall administration of their portfolios; for carrying the introduction of new legislation through Parliament; and for answering questions on that portfolio when required.

As we have seen, Ministers' responsibility for the administration of their Portfolios means that there is very little that happens in their Department that is beyond their purview. (The exceptions, of course, are the specific functions of Secretaries and Agency Heads that are conferred on them by Statute.)

This does not mean that they should, or indeed could, be aware of every action of their Department. The degree of their involvement depends on the Minister's own preference and overall workload, and the relationship between the Minister and his or her Secretary. It also depends on the nature of the issue. Some administrative functions, such as grant administration, are very close to the policy process and Ministers may prefer to draw a clear line between their approval of a grant scheme and its guidelines, and their Department's administration of that scheme.

Similarly, the Ministers cannot be held accountable for every action of their Departments. But a Minister could be held responsible where the issues were of such significance that he or she was aware (or should have been aware) of them, where an error followed a previous fault and was not corrected, or where the Minister was involved in a judgement that proved unwise.

One of the important roles that a Secretary has is to ensure that the Minister is aware of important or sensitive administrative issues, or issues that could impact on the Minister's policy responsibility.

Simple lack of knowledge is not always an appropriate defence. In these situations, the advice that is sometimes heard "Minister, it's better that you don't know", is well intended but questionable.

Secretaries of Departments

As is the case for Ministers, Secretaries cannot be held accountable for every action of the Department. But the Secretaries' responsibilities for putting appropriate administrative systems in place, for monitoring their performance and for taking corrective action where necessary, means that their day to day responsibility is considerably more direct.

Ministers can devolve the administration of their Departments to Secretaries but not their policy responsibilities. The Secretary's responsibility as chief public service policy adviser to the Minister is to give expert, dispassionate policy advice, taking into account an understanding of the Government's policies and directions. The advice should be frank and honest - one of the Values of the Public Service Bill (Section 10) - but Secretaries must, of course, be able to adjust and respond to the Minister's direction once this is determined.

In addition to their direct responsibilities to their Ministers, are Secretaries accountable directly to Parliament or to the Government more broadly?

Traditionally, Secretaries' accountability to Parliament is through their Ministers and is for the administration of their departments. Secretaries also have a responsibility to assist the Minister to fulfil his or her own accountability obligations by providing information to the Parliament about the technical background to policies and their implementation and administration. Importantly, of course, public servants are not answerable to Parliament on policy decisions taken by the Government.

The question of the accountability of Secretaries to Cabinet or the Government in addition to their direct accountability to their own Ministers is a difficult one. Some of us will have been faced with a situation where a Prime Minister or Cabinet has asked us to counter a proposition made by our Minister where the Minister was arguing a firmly held policy position.

The Secretary's problem in this situation is of course, that he or she is being questioned by leaders of a democratically elected government.

It seems generally accepted in the Australian context, however, that the accountability relationship is directly with the Minister, and should only be broken in extreme circumstances such as where it was suspected that the Minister was breaking the law.

As Bill Cole points out:

"In serving Ministers rather than the Parliament directly, the Public Service must nevertheless operate within the framework of legislation passed by the Parliament. The one absolute constraint on Ministerial direction of the Public Service is the requirement for both Minister and Public Servants to operate within the law" .

These basic accountability relationships have not changed as a result of the reduction in regulation and red tape and the greater devolution of power to Agency Heads. But in a more devolved, and less regulated and prescribed environment, the need to be aware of them on a day-to-day basis takes on a greater significance.

Legislative Authority

Legislation itself can be an important mechanism for accountability, providing the means by which standards of conduct are established and accountability determined. It can highlight the distinctive features of the public service and the public interest principles on which it is founded, and can establish the collective standards that should apply in the interests of good government.

The Public Service Bill, for example, describes and establishes the core principles, values and characteristics which create the distinctive culture and ethos of the APS. It also provides a clear, unified framework and enabling provisions within which the APS can carry out its distinctive roles and responsibilities.

The proposed legislation is also explicit in terms of scrutiny. The onus is placed directly on Secretaries to uphold and promote the APS Values, they are bound by the Code of Conduct in the same way as APS employees (Sections 12 and 14 respectively), and they are required to provide the Public Service Commissioner with whatever information is needed for the Commissioner's annual report to Parliament on the state of the APS (Section 44).

Accounting for performance

Under the terms of the new Public Service Bill, Secretaries are employed by the Prime Minister, who also determines their remuneration and other conditions of appointment. Other Agency Heads are employed by, and have their remuneration and conditions determined by, their Agency Minister.

Although the employment of Secretaries by the Prime Minister could be seen as breaking their direct accountability relationship to their own Minister under whom they administer their departments, this provision could have real benefits in providing the opportunity for a balanced and moderated assessment across Secretaries as a group, taking the views of individual Ministers into account.

In view of the inclusion of performance pay in the remuneration package for other senior Public Service staff, there will undoubtedly be consideration of a similar provision for Secretaries. The natural corollary of this consideration will be whether it should be assessed on the basis of a written performance agreement.

None of us would argue about the benefits of performance assessment and feedback, the need to benchmark performance against best practice, or the significant positive role that recognition of, and reward for, good performance can play.

There is, however, a degree of debate about the introduction of written performance agreements for Secretaries and Agency Heads, in view of the particular relationship that exists at this level between the Political and the Public Service systems.

In his discussion of the role of Secretaries, Mike Codd was particularly cautious about performance agreements at this level, arguing that:

"their application to Secretaries of executive departments undoubtedly changes in a fundamental way the basic principles and conventions underlying Minister-Secretary relationships in Westminster systems." (Codd p.16)

In considering possibilities in this area, therefore, it is worthwhile to run through some of the concerns that have been expressed about performance agreements at this level.

The concern most frequently mentioned is that Secretaries would be less inclined to give frank and fearless advice to Government in cases where it would not be welcome. This could be a particular temptation where a significant percentage of remuneration was at stake.

In the environment of tension that is frequently created by the political process, such a response could not be ruled out. When Sir Frederick Wheeler was asked about a particular event which seemed to spring from the lack of frank advice on the part of a Department Head, he sadly defined the problem as a lack of "character". Certainly a performance agreement was not in place in this case. But it may be that Sir Frederick's response is as good as any in a very difficult area.

A second concern expressed is that Secretaries could become so responsive to Ministers that they crossed the boundary between non partisan advice and advocacy. This could occur either from a desire to show a high degree of support for the government's directions or from the belief that public advocacy was required in order to achieve a particular performance target.

There has been considerable discussion of a perceived tension between Secretaries as administrators of government policy and Secretaries as responsive advisers. It should be quite possible, however, to be actively responsive to the government's policy direction and environment while continuing to proffer dispassionate advice. The tension is more likely to lie between responsiveness accompanied by the provision of information about policy to the public, and public political advocacy which is more appropriately a role for elected government. In this context, it should be noted that the first of the Values listed in the Public Service Bill is that "the APS is apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial and professional manner" (Section 10).

A third concern that has been raised lies with who would do the assessment against the performance agreement. It has been argued that most Ministers and Prime Ministers do not understand the detail of the administrative role that is played by Secretaries and Agency Heads and are not sufficiently close to it on an on-going basis to make a proper assessment.

Some systems have seen the answer to this concern to lie in peer assessment. In New Zealand, the State Services Commissioner regularly reviews the performance of each Agency Head against his or her agreement. In Canada, a similar role is performed by a group of officials chaired by the Clerk of the Privy Council Office. And the Public Sector Management and Employment Bill, recently introduced into the Parliament of Victoria, requires the Commissioner of Public Employment to review the performance of an Agency Head to assess "the manner and extent to which the Agency Head is fulfilling all the requirements imposed on him or her, whether under this Act or otherwise."

Fourthly, perhaps the most difficult issue is the content of any performance agreement. The real problem here is to draw the line between the responsibilities of the Minister and of the Secretary, so that Secretaries' performance can be assessed on issues that lie within their control.

The relationship between Minister and Secretary is heavily dependent on building confidence and trust and on effective teamwork. Any factors that were to get in the way of that working relationship, and that could encourage Secretaries to see a distinction between their own interests and those of their Minister, could impact adversely on the effectiveness of the government process overall.

The New Zealand distinction between Ministerial responsibility for outcomes and Secretary responsibility for outputs is often too simplistic. The delivery of outputs can be surrounded by constraints such as changes in government policy or priorities, the continued availability of funding, and the time required before the measure of success can be assessed.

In addition, the policy and priority changes inherent in the political cycle are likely to prove sensitive for governments if the changes are exposed by changes to a Secretary's performance agreement. Even if not made publicly available, performance agreements can become public through questions from Senate Legislation Committees seeking to embarrass the Government of the day.

I should emphasise again that the concerns that have been raised tend to focus on written performance agreements. But they are concerns that we must keep in mind when we consider performance assessment at this level. They also serve to focus our minds on some of the complexities of accountability in the context of the Secretary-Minister relationship.

The future balance

These are important issues at a time when, it could be argued, the demand for high level performance from public sector agencies is greater than ever before and can only increase. Indeed, the devolution of greater flexibilities and management powers to agency heads is specifically to enable them to respond to that demand.

The MAB/MIAC paper on Accountability argues for devolution as securing a better match between authority and responsibility:

"Centralised controls risk a blurring of the relationship between responsibility and authority so that no-one accepts responsibility where those who are tasked to achieve certain goals lack sufficient authority."

Secretaries and Agency Heads have now been given the authority and responsibility and, in answer to the question at the start of this paper, the broad framework of relationships appears to stand up well to the change.

In embracing the flexibility, creativity and opportunity that this change can bring, however, it will be important for us to keep the framework in mind and to focus also on our professionalism, our sense of proper process, and our values:

• proper process (and by this I don't mean red tape, slow process or risk-averse process) because, as Mike Keating has pointed out, good process does not guarantee a good outcome but bad process carries a real risk of a bad outcome ; and
• values because recognition and absorption of organisational values is important for all high performing organisations. APS Values are, of course, clearly set out for us in the Public Service Bill.

It is the total package that is important if we are to achieve world class public sector performance.

The Minister for the Public Service, Dr David Kemp, is one of the strongest supporters of the removal of central control and prescription as the road to achieving a more efficient, innovative and world class Public Service. He is also very aware of the importance of the APS Values in maintaining the integrity and professionalism of the Service.

As he said in his introduction to Reforms in the APS:

"In planning for the future, we clearly do not want to lose the best characteristics of the APS: integrity and honesty, professionalism, and a willingness to give comprehensive and creative policy and technical advice. These characteristics are no less important for the future than they are now or have been in previous years."

 

1 Mike Codd "The Role of Secretaries of Departments in the APS". Senior Executive Staffing Unit Occasional Paper No.8, Public Service Commission, 1990.

2 Submission by the Public Service Commissioner to the Review of the Public Service 1922. 1994, p.24.

3 Paul Keating Performance & Accountability in the Public Service. Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration No.75, December 1993, p.2.

4 Timothy W. Plumptre Beyond the Bottom Line: Management in Government. The Institute for Research on Public Policy, Canada, August 1998, p.153.

Policy Parameters for Agreement Making in APS , Department of Industrial Relations, May 1997.

Bruce McCallum The Public Service Manager, Longman Cheshire, 1984, p.109.

Australian House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1901; Vol 1 p.1300-4.

D.C. McLachlan Report of the Royal Commission on Public Service Administration. January 1919, p.6.

Denis Ives The Role of the Public Service Commission in the Australian Public Service. State of the Service Paper No.2, 1993, p.5.

R.W.Cole The Role of the Public Service in a Changing Environment , 1979.

Public Sector Management and Employment Bill., 1998, Parliament of Victoria.

Accountability in the Commonwealth Public Sector. Management Advisory Board and its Management Improvement Advisory Committee, No.11, June 1993, p.154.

M.S.Keating The Role of the Public Service in Policy Development, June 1995.

Reforms to the APS - What we are doing. Public Service and Merit Protection Commission, 1998.